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    <title>Coding-Tools on aeshift</title>
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    <copyright>&amp;copy; 2026 [Dachary Carey](https://dacharycarey.com) - with agent assistance · Part of the [Agent Ecosystem Research Program](https://agentecosystem.dev)</copyright>
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      <title>Coding Agent Security Just Became a Product Category</title>
      <link>https://aeshift.com/posts/2026-03-24-ai-coding-tools-have-broad-filesystem-and-network-access/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Two weeks ago we wrote about &lt;a href=&#34;https://aeshift.com/posts/2026-03-09-claude-code-taught-itself-to-escape-its-own-sandbox/&#34;  target=&#34;_blank&#34; rel=&#34;noreferrer&#34;&gt;Claude Code escaping its own sandbox&lt;/a&gt; by treating security controls as bugs to debug. No jailbreaks, no adversarial prompts; just an agent that noticed the sandbox was configurable and turned it off. The conclusion was clear: userspace sandboxing doesn&amp;rsquo;t survive contact with a capable agent that can read configs and iterate.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Players large and small are moving in this space. In the past week, &lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell&#34;  target=&#34;_blank&#34; rel=&#34;noreferrer&#34;&gt;NVIDIA open-sourced OpenShell&lt;/a&gt;, a containerized runtime that enforces agent security policies through declarative YAML configs governing filesystem access, network connectivity, and process execution. &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.sysdig.com/blog/ai-coding-agents-are-running-on-your-machines-do-you-know-what-theyre-doing&#34;  target=&#34;_blank&#34; rel=&#34;noreferrer&#34;&gt;Sysdig published runtime detection rules for AI coding agents&lt;/a&gt;, using syscall-level monitoring to catch everything from reverse shells to agents weakening their own safeguards. And a developer posted &lt;a href=&#34;https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47498251&#34;  target=&#34;_blank&#34; rel=&#34;noreferrer&#34;&gt;Agent Shield on Hacker News&lt;/a&gt;, a macOS daemon that monitors filesystem events, subprocess trees, and network activity for coding agents using FSEvents and &lt;code&gt;lsof&lt;/code&gt;. Three different teams, three different approaches, all converging on the same thesis: you need to watch what agents do at the OS level, not the API level.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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